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SIGNING STATEMENTS AS DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS:
THE PRESIDENT AS JUDGE
Phillip J. Cooper*
INTRODUCTION
Even though there had been scholarly consideration of the use and abuse of
presidential signing statements earlier,' and even an analysis of the George W. Bush
administration's particularly aggressive approach to the use of this policy tool in its
first four years in office,2 serious public attention and increased professional and
scholarly assessments really began in January 2006. The ongoing conflict between
Congress and President Bush over interrogations and conditions of detention at the
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, facility that housed those the administration termed "illegal
combatants" had resulted in a very public agreement by the President to address abu-
sive practices. The President, in a White House photo opportunity with Senator John
McCain, agreed to sign legislation that would address the problem. 4 However, his
signing statement, issued on December 30, 2005, made clear that the administration
intended to interpret and implement that legislation as it saw fit and not necessarily
as Congress had intended or written. 5 That news broke just as Samuel Alito was prepar-
ing to face confirmation hearings in the Senate Judiciary Committee on his nomination
to become an Associate Justice of the United States Supreme Court. It became clear
from materials released before those hearings that Alito, while at the Justice Department,
had issued a now well-known memorandum on February 5, 1986, explaining how
signing statements could be used by the White House to enhance presidential power.6
* Professor of Public Administration, Mark 0. Hatfield School of Government, Portland
State University.
See, e.g., PHILIP J. COOPER, BY ORDER OF THE PRESIDENT: THE USE AND ABUSE OF
EXECUTIVE DmEcr ACTION (2002); Marc N. Garber & Kurt A. Wimmer, Presidential Signing
Statements as Interpretations of Legislative Intent: An Executive Aggrandizement of Power,
24 HARv. J. ON LEGIs. 363 (1987); William D. Popkin, Judicial Use of Presidential Legislative
History, 66 IND. L.J. 699 (1991); Brad Waltes, Note, Let me Tell You What You Mean: An
Analysis of Presidential Signing Statements, 21 GA. L. REv. 755 (1987).
2 Phillip J. Cooper, George W. Bush, Edgar Allan Poe, and the Use and Abuse of
Presidential Signing Statements, 35 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 515 (2005).
' McCain, BushAgree on Torture Ban, CNN, Dec. 15, 2005, http://www.cnn.com/2005/
POLITICS/12/15/torture.bill/.
4 id.
' Statement on Signing the Department of Defense, Emergency Supplemental Appro-
priations to Address Hurricanes in the Gulf of Mexico, and Pandemic Influenza Act, 2005,
41 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1918 (Dec. 30, 2006).
6 Memorandum from Samuel A. Alito, Jr., Deputy Ass't Att'y Gen. to Litig. Strategy
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Since then, scholars, legal practitioners, and legislators have spent considerable energy
attempting to understand this policy tool and what its use and abuse mean for the
separation of powers and the checks and balances under the U.S. Constitution, as well
as to determine its practical implications for public policy.
As interest and concern spread, it became apparent, even to the newcomers to the
discussion, that the Bush administration had not been the first to use signing state-
ments to react to the passage of legislation, but that there plainly had been a deliberate
expansion of the use of the device, starting with the Reagan administration.7 That
said, from the first study of the George W. Bush administration on, it became clear
that this administration was making a more frequent, systematic, and expansive use
of the instrument based on extremely broad claims of presidential power that asserted
nearly unchecked authority in anything related to foreign or military affairs on the
basis of an asserted prerogative power, as well as dramatic assertions of broad domestic
power supported by the so-called unitary theory of the executive. Indeed, in its first
term, the George W. Bush administration had advanced the unitary theory of the
executive as the basis for more of its constitutional objections to provisions in legis-
lation that the President nevertheless signed into law than any other justification.8
Not surprisingly, the criticism and controversy surrounding the use and abuse of
signing statements centered on the relationship between Congress and the White House,
with particular concern for the Presentment Clause of the Constitution, Article I,
Section 7. With the use of the signing statement as a kind of substantive line item veto,
a practice already rejected by the Supreme Court,9 and a simultaneous recognition of
the utter failure of Congress to pay attention to its own institutional operations and to
defend its Article I powers, ° the focus of discussion was on the ways in which the
contemporary use of the signing statement affected the checks and balances and the
separation of powers it was designed to protect between these two institutions."
However, there is another set of questions worthy of attention that have to do with
White House actions that move into the sphere of judicial powers under Article IHI.
Working Group (Feb. 5, 1986), available at http://www.archives.gov/news/samuel-alito/
accession-060-89-269/AccO60-89-269-box6-SG-LSWG-AlitotoLSWG-Feb1986.pdf.
7 See Popkin, supra note 1, at 702.
8 Cooper, supra note 2, at 522.
9 See Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998).
'0 See THOMAS E. MANN & NORMAN J. ORNSTEIN, THE BROKEN BRANCH: How CONGRESS
Is FAILING AMERICA AND How TO GET IT BACK ON TRACK (2006).
" See AM. BAR ASs'N TASK FORCE ON PRESIDENTIAL SIGNING STATEMENTS AND THE
SEPARATION OF POWERS DOCTRINE (2006) available at http://www.abanet.org/op/signing
statements/abafinal-signing-statements-recommendation-repoit_7-24-06.pdf; THE COALnON
TO DEFEND CHECKS AND BALANCES, THE CONSTITUTION PROJECT, STATEMENT ON PRESI-
DENTIAL SIGNING STATEMENTS, available at http://www.constitutionproject.org/pdf/Statement
_onPresidentialSigningStatement.pdf; T.J. HALSTEAD, CONG. RES. SERV., REPORT FOR
CONGRESS: PRESIDENTIAL SIGNING STATEMENTS: CONSTITUTIONAL AND INSTITUTIONAL
IMPLICATIONS (2007) available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL33667.pdf.
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Indeed, when one examines the use of signing statements since the Reagan years, it
becomes clear that, in addition to its efforts to enhance its powers as against the legis-
lature, the White House has also sought to enhance executive authority in part by acting
as if it were a court. This Article examines this aspect of the signing statement phe-
nomenon. The argument proceeds by first examining the reinvigoration of signing
statement practice by the Reagan administration and after that, the included intentions,
both overtly stated and in practice, to challenge the judiciary. It then turns to several
types of court-like action that have been evident in contemporary signing statement
practice. These actions include the use of five judicial devices in signing statements,
including a kind of declaratory judgment, 2 interpretation of statutes to shape appli-
cable legal tests or standards, 3 application ofjudicial canons of interpretation to avoid
constitutional conflict, 14 pronouncements on Article 111 cases and controversy issues, 5
and executive findings contrary to judicial rulings as a kind of reversal of judicial
action by signing statement. 16
I. THE TARGETS OF MODERN SIGNING STATEMENT STRATEGY INCLUDED
JUDICIAL ACTION
The effort to develop the signing statement into an effective instrument of
presidential power that would support an expansion of executive power, limit the
authority of Congress, and seek to shape and constrain the judiciary was no accident,
but rather part of a deliberate strategy aimed at a number of clear goals. Acting in sig-
nificant part through his trusted, long-time California colleague, Attorney General
Edwin Meese, the President sought to restore powers that he thought had been taken
from the White House in the wake of the Watergate debacle, to shape the judiciary in
an effort to take the law and the courts in a dramatically different direction from what
then existed as Reagan partisans saw it, and to reassert presidential leadership as against
congressional action. To that end, the administration took great pains with its oppor-
tunities to appoint judges who would be effective and, to the extent possible, predict-
able conservatives in the Reagan sense; to select, train, and direct political appointees
to challenge existing legal interpretations, statutes, and rules of which the adminis-
tration disapproved; and to make effective use of tools of presidential direct action
to shape legal interpretations, policy, process, and institutions. 1'
12 See infra Part II.A.
" See infra Part II.B.
14 See infra Part II.C.
"5 See infra Part II.D.
16 See infra Part II.E.
" See Attorney General Edwin Meese III, Address at the National Press Club (Feb. 25,
1986) in U.S. GOV'T PRINTING OFFICE, MAJOR POLICY STATEMENTS OF THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL: EDWIN MEESE III 78-79 (1989); EDWIN MEESE III, WrrH REAGAN: THE INSIDE
STORY (1992).
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Although there has been considerable attention paid to the Alito memorandum
of 1986, it was only part of the strategic development of presidential signing state-
ments during the Reagan years. In order to understand the targets in that effort and
the ways in which these devices would be used, it is helpful to consider further the
process of enhancement of signing statement practice.
A. The Calabresi and Harrison Roadmap for Turning Signing Statements into
Effective Tools to Affect Legal Interpretations and Decisions
The specific press for the development of the signing statement into an effective
tool to advance the administration's agenda came in an August 23, 1985, memorandum
for the Attorney General from Steve Calabresi 18 and John Harrison. 9 The memo
complained of activist judges and their interpretations of statutes:
The abuse of legislative history is a major way in which legislative
power is usurped by activist courts, idealogically [sic] motivated
Congressional staffers and lobbying groups. If statutes are to be
taken seriously as law, legislative history should be a guide to the
interpretation of statutory language, not a substitute for it. Never-
theless, courts bent on reading statutes their own way routinely
take advantage of legislative history deliberately created without
the full awareness of Congress. °
They argued that while it would be useful for the Justice Department to examine
carefully "the whole question of legislative reports," there was a device available that
could be used in an effort to correct the judiciary and shape statutory interpretation.2'
"[W]e have available a potentially powerful, if so far unused, tool: Presidential sign-
ing statements. The President's signing statement represents the basis on which a
"S Calabresi, who has described himself as a devotee of presidentialism, has been an ardent
advocate of the unitary theory of the executive. See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi, The Virtues
of Presidential Government: Why Professor Ackerman is Wrong to Prefer the German to the
U.S. Constitution, 18 CONST. COMMENT.51 (2001); Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes,
The Structural Constitution: Unitary Executive, Plural Judiciary, 105 HARV. L. REv. 1155
(1992); Christopher S. Yoo, Steven G. Calabresi, & Anthony Colangelo, The Unitary
Executive in the Modern Era, 1945-2004,90 IOWA L. REv. 601 (2005); Christopher S. Yoo,
Steven G. Calabresi, & Laurence D. Nee, The Unitary Executive During the Third Half-
Century, 1889-1945, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1 (2004).
19 Memorandum from Steve Calabresi & John Harrison to Edwin Meese In, Att'y Gen.
(Aug. 23, 1985), in Memorandum from Steve Galebach to Chuck Cooper (Jan. 7, 1988)
available at http://www.archives.gov/news/samuel-alito/accession-060-89-269/accession-
060-89-269.zip.
20 id.
21 Id.
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necessary participant gave his consent to legislation. It is even better than a committee
report because it represents an entire branch's view of the matter. ,22
Calabresi and Harrison warned, however, that the department had not looked
seriously at the possibilities presented by signing statements to "protect the institu-
tional prerogatives of the Executive Branch. Indeed, the Justice Department can
probably revolutionize this area of law simply by acting on [its] own initiative."23 In
order to render signing statements important factors in shaping the meaning and appli-
cation of statutes, they said, it would be necessary to make the process for generating
them more regular and systematic, to ensure that the President's interpretations were
readily available in places where legal professionals would look for such materials
and to develop a sense of the authoritative nature of these opinions.24 Up to that point,
none of these challenges had been addressed. In fact, even "Department of Justice
lawyers rarely cite signing statements in their briefs but regularly rely on Congressional
legislative history. 25
B. Implementation of the Calabresi and Harrison Strategy: Toward Three
Critical Applications
The Calabresi and Harrison agenda would provide the blueprint over the next
several months for the Reagan administration's efforts to transform signing statements
into an effective tool of presidential power. First, they suggested that the Attorney
General should "[wirite the West Publishing Company and ask them to publish
Presidential signing statements in the same fashion as they publish Congressional
Reports. In the unlikely event that West refuses, we should get wider publication and
distribution through the Government Printing Office. 26 They also indicated that Meese
should "[a]sk the Litigation Strategy Working Group headed by Charles Fried to
develop methods for distributing the Presidential signing statements in existence to
our staff attorneys., 27 Department of Justice attorneys should then be directed to cite
the signing statements as compared to the then current practice in which "[t]he Office
of Legal Counsel currently is virtually the only place where signing statements are
referred to." 28 Finally, they suggested that the Attorney General could publicize sign-
ing statements and bolster their authoritative character by having "the Office of
Legal Counsel draft a law review article for your signature" and by giving speeches
to legal audiences.29
22 Id.
23 Id.
24 See id.
25 Id.
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 id.
29 Id.
2007]
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
T. Kenneth Cribb, Counselor to the Attorney General, then to work on that
agenda. On September 3, 1985, he wrote a memorandum to Charles Fried, then head
of the Litigation Strategy Working Group, indicating that the Attorney General had
decided that presidential signing statements
are an underused tool of the Executive, especially as a counter
to the abuse of legislative reports by staff, lobbyists and courts.
He wants to clarify the conceptual issues associated with the use
of signing statements as guides to legislative interpretation and
increase their use, by both the Department as well as lawyers,
judges and commentators.3 °
Cribb explained that he asked the Office of Legal Policy (OLP) to prepare a paper on
key issues and ways in which the use of signing statement interpretations could be
encouraged.31 He also indicated that the Litigation Strategy Working Group should
then use the OLP document to prepare a talking paper that could be used to develop
the signing statement into a more effective device.32 Cribb also wrote James M. Spears,
Acting Assistant Attorney General of the OLP, calling on his office to move on the
West Publishing recommendations and other options as well as to start work on a
memorandum on issues relative to the use of signing statements and efforts to "raise
the legal community's awareness" of their significance.33
He wrote as well to Ralph Tarr, then Acting Assistant Attorney General of the
Office of Legal Counsel, asking him to examine the current process for the preparation
of signing statements and how it might be improved:
[S]hould we devote more resources to it, for example, and should
we take measures to make sure that signing statements respond
to unfavorable material in congressional reports? Also, do you
know of anyone other than OLC who ever relies on signing state-
ments? Are they accessible through any of the normal tools of
legal research?34
30 Memorandum from T. Kenneth Cribb, Counselor to Att'y Gen., to Charles Fried, Acting
Solicitor Gen., (Sept. 3, 1985), in Memorandum from Steve Galebach to Chuck Cooper (Jan.
7, 1988) available at http://www.archives.gov/news/samuel-alito/accession-060-89-269/
accession-060-89-269.zip.
31 Id.
32 Id.
33 Memorandum from T. Kenneth Cribb, Counselor to Att'y Gen., to James M. Spears,
Acting Ass't Att'y Gen. (Sept. 3, 1985), in Memorandum from Steve Galebach to Chuck
Cooper (Jan. 7, 1988) available at http://www.archives.gov/news/samuel-alito/accession-
060-89-269/accession-060-89-269.zip.
3 Memorandum, T. Kenneth Cribb, Counselor to Att'y Gen., to Ralph Tarr, Acting Ass't
Att'y Gen. (Sept. 3, 1985), in Memorandum from Steve Galebach to Chuck Cooper (Jan. 7,
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Tarr's reply made it clear that there were at least three important targets for
enhanced use of signing statements, including the courts, Congress, and administra-
tive agencies.35 He was particularly emphatic about the fact that efforts should be
made to enhance the role of signing statements as authoritative interpretations of law
to be used in courts and other legal arguments, stressing that courts had already em-
ployed signing statements in their opinions and that more could and should be done
to enhance the process.36 He attached a memorandum that he had dispatched a few
days earlier to the OLP, arguing, "It should be the policy of this Department, and of
the Executive Branch generally, to encourage courts to view signing statements as
authoritative statutory history."37 He also urged that they be used as authoritative
interpretations of statutes binding on executive branch agencies:
[T]hey can be used to tell agencies how to interpret a statute. The
President can direct agencies to ignore unconstitutional provisions
or to read provisions in a way that eliminates constitutional or
policy problems. This direction permits the President to seize
the initiative in creating what will eventually be the agency's
interpretation-an interpretation that the courts have tradition-
ally given great deference.38
In fact, he attached an April 1985 memorandum from Acting Deputy Attorney
General D. Lowell Jensen to Fred Fielding, then Counsel to the President, complain-
ing that there had been difficulties because of the refusal to issue a signing statement
with respect to Appointments Clause issues in the Pacific Salmon Treaty Act and insist-
ing that "signing statements perform important functions by placing an interpretation
on a statute and by giving instructions to the agency charged with the administration
of a statute. 39 In sum, signing statements should be treated as authoritative legal
interpretations that should shape decisionmaking in administrative agencies and courts.
1988) available at http://www.archives.gov/news/samuel-alito/accession-060-89-269/accession-
060-89-269.zip.
31 Memorandum, Ralph W. Tarr, Acting Ass't Att'y Gen., to T. Kenneth Cribb, Counselor
to Att'y Gen. (Oct. 28, 1985), in Memorandum from Steve Galebach to Chuck Cooper (Jan. 7,
1988) available at http://www.archives.gov/news/samuel-alito/accession-060-89-269/accession-
060-89-269.zip.
36 id.
37 Memorandum from Ralph W. Tarr, Acting Ass't Att'y Gen., to James M. Spears, Acting
Ass't Att'y Gen., (Oct. 23, 1985), in Memorandum from Steve Galebach to Chuck Cooper
(Jan. 7, 1988) available at http://www.archives.gov/news/samuel-alito/accession-060-89-269/
accession-060-89-269.zip.
38 Tarr to Cribb, supra note 35.
'9 Memorandum from D. Lowell Jensen, Acting Deputy Att'y Gen., to Fred Fielding,
Counsel to the President, (Apr. 2, 1985), in Memorandum from Steve Galebach to Chuck
Cooper (Jan. 7, 1988) available at http://www.archives.gov/news/samuel-alito/accession-
060-89-269/accession-060-89-269.zip.
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C. The Alito Memorandum and the Move Toward Implementation of the
Reinvigorated Signing Statement
By the time of the now famous February 1986 Alito memorandum produced for
the Litigation Strategy Working Group, the effort to turn the presidential signing state-
ment into an effective and authoritative tool was already well underway. The West
Publishing Company had acceded to the request to publish the statements in U.S. Code
Congressional and Administrative News; the Attorney General was speaking out pub-
licly on the importance of signing statements; and the Department was debating how
to enhance the process for, and effectiveness of, signing statements within the executive
branch, within Congress, and in court.4 ° The Alito document emphasized what was
really new about what the administration was attempting to do in reshaping the device
and described cautions that he considered important if the effort was to be successful.
Alito began:
Our primary objective is to ensure that Presidential signing state-
ments assume their rightful place in the interpretation of legislation.
In the past, Presidents have issued signing statements when pre-
sented with bills raising constitutional problems. OLC has played
a role in this process, and the present proposal would not substan-
tively alter that process. The novelty of the proposal previously
discussed by this Group is the suggestion that Presidential signing
statements be used to address questions of interpretation.41
He recognized that the approach that the Reagan administration was taking was
a significant departure from past practice and that it would enhance presidential power.42
From the perspective of the Executive Branch, the issuance of
interpretive signing statements would have two chief advantages.
First, it would increase the power of the Executive to shape the
law. Second, by forcing some rethinking by courts, scholars,
40 See supra Part I.B.
4' Alito, supra note 6, at 1.
42 Part of the reason undoubtedly is that Presidents, unlike Congress, do
not customarily comment on their understanding of bills. Congress chums
out great masses of legislative history bearing on its intent-committee
reports, floor debates, and hearings. Presidents have traditionally created
nothing comparable. Presidents have seldom explained in any depth or
detail how they interpreted the bills they have signed. Presidential ap-
proval is usually accompanied by a statement that is often little more than
a press release.
Id. at 1-2.
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and litigants, it may help to curb some of the prevalent abuses of
legislative history.43
Clearly, he warned, this major move on signing statements would be seen for
what it was.
It seems likely that our new type of signing statement will not be
warmly welcomed by Congress. The novelty of the procedure and
the potential increase of presidential power are two factors that may
account for this anticipated reaction. In addition, and perhaps most
important, Congress is likely to resent the fact that the President
will get in the last word on questions of interpretation.'
Among the reasons that the claim to such authority would not likely be missed was
that the Attorney General had been involved in a very public battle with Congress and
the courts over a very controversial use of a presidential signing statement with respect
to the Competition in Contracting Act issued in 1984 that would come to be known
as the Ameron case discussed later in this Article.4 5 For these and other reasons, Alito
offered a series of cautions as to how, and how often, signing statements ought to be
employed.' Indeed, by the time the George W. Bush administration had demonstrated
its consistent and sweeping use of signing statements, Alito' s warnings had clearly been
forgotten, but he recognized early on that the use of signing statements would expand
presidential claims to power and would be opposed in significant part because of the
White House's attempt to have "the last word on questions of interpretation.
'47
11. THE PRESIDENCY, SIGNING STATEMENTS, AND JUDICIAL FUNCTIONS
This process of development of signing statements not only raised separation of
powers and checks and balances issues with respect to legislative powers, but also with
respect to core judicial activities and the devices available to courts for the accom-
plishment of those tasks. They involved situations in which the chief executive, in
issuing signing statements, behaved as if the President was a judge. These judicial
devices fall into a number of broad categories and include instruments that purport
to provide an authoritative statement of the law and declare the relative powers and
41 Id. at 2.
4AId.
' Ameron v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 607 F. Supp. 962 (D.N.J. 1985), cert dismissed,
488 U.S. 918 (1988); see also Lear Siegler v. Lehman, 842 F.2d 1102 (9th Cir. 1988); see
infra text accompanying note 77.
6 Alito, supra note 6, at 4-6.
47 Id. at 2.
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limits of important parties at issue in the debate; statements that purport to tell the
court what is or is not a case or controversy within its Article III province or that reject
its authority to engage an issue; and tactical devices used to block review. More specifi-
cally, consider five such judicial devices employed in presidential signing statements.
A. Judicial Device One: Signing Statements as Declaratory Judgments
A variety of presidential signing statements in recent years have gone well beyond
a statement of disagreement by the President with Congress to: (1) a declaratory state-
ment by the White House either that provisions in a bill the President is signing are
unconstitutional; (2) a statement meant to be definitive and authoritative as to the mean-
ing of language in a bill which is to bind government officials; or even (3) a statement
as to the procedural or substantive rights of parties in--or likely to be in--controversy
with the federal government. These statements are, in effect, declaratory judgments
issued in the form of presidential signing statements.48
Certainly one of the most obvious contemporary examples of this phenomenon
came in the now famous signing statement on the Detainee Protection Act portion of
the Department of Defense, Emergency Supplemental Appropriations to Address Hurri-
canes in the Gulf of Mexico, and Pandemic Influenza Act, 2006, signed in December
of 2005."9 Although most attention was paid to the presidential assertions about issues
of the boundaries of permissible interrogation techniques, there was also a portion of
that statement that purported to provide an authoritative interpretation of the ability
of the detainees to pursue judicial assessment of the legality of their confinement.
The President stated:
The executive branch shall construe Title X in Division A of the
Act, relating to detainees, in a manner consistent with the consti-
tutional authority of the President to supervise the unitary executive
branch and as Commander in Chief and consistent with the con-
stitutional limitations on the judicial power, which will assist in
achieving the shared objective of the Congress and the President,
evidenced in Title X, of protecting the American people from fur-
ther terrorist attacks. Further, in light of the principles enunciated
by the Supreme Court of the United States in 2001 in Alexander v.
4' A declaratory judgment is "[a] judgment which declares conclusively the rights and
duties, or the status of the parties." BALLENTINE'S LAW DICTIONARY 315 (3d ed. 1969); see
Medimmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 764,770 (2007) (discussing the Declaratory
Judgement Act).
9 Statement on Signing of the Department of Defense, Emergency Supplemental Appro-
priations to Address Hurricanes in the Gulf of Mexico, and Pandemic Influenza Act, 2006,
41 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 1918 (Dec. 30, 2005).
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Sandoval, and noting that the text and structure of Title X do not
create a private right of action to enforce Title X, the executive
branch shall construe Title X not to create a private right of action.
Finally, given the decision of the Congress reflected in subsections
1005(e) and 1005(h) that the amendments made to section 2241 of
title 28, United States Code, shall apply to past, present, and future
actions, including applications for writs of habeas corpus, described
in that section, and noting that section 1005 does not confer any
constitutional right upon an alien detained abroad as an enemy
combatant, the executive branch shall construe section 1005 to pre-
clude the Federal courts from exercising subject matter jurisdiction
over any existing or future action, including applications for writs
of habeas corpus, described in section 1005.50
Here the President as judge not only provided what purported to be a definitive
interpretation of the statute itself, and of the constitutional powers of the President
and Congress, but also of the judiciary' s power to include what purported to be authori-
tative interpretations of Title 28 of the U.S. Code. President Bush made plain his view
that the Commander-in-Chief power and the vague formulation so often employed
in Bush signing statements, known as the unitary executive theory, would justify the
administration taking whatever steps the President considered necessary to protect the
American public against terrorism as the White House saw it.5' However, he went be-
yond that to make a number of points with regard to particular rights of the detainees
and limitations on the courts to do anything about the situation. Whereas the clear
understanding with Congress was that currently pending cases would be permitted
to continue through the process to obtain judicial determination as to the validity of
confinement and decisionmaking procedures in use at Guantanamo-but block future
cases-the signing statement flatly declared that the legislation barred "past, present,
and future actions, including applications for writs of habeas corpus."5"
That signing statement further opined that, given the Supreme Court's decision
in Alexander v. Sandoval and its own interpretation of both the judicial opinion and
Title X of the present statute, there was no implied private right of action to bring suit
to enforce the provisions of the legislation.53 Finally, it concluded, on its interpretation
of these and other provisions of the statute, that the legislation "preclude[s] the Federal
courts from exercising subject matterjurisdiction over any existing or future action,
including applications for writs of habeas corpus, described in section 1 0 0 5 ."5'
'0 Id. at 1919.
51 Id.
52 Id.
53 id.
4 id.
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Based upon its declaration of law and the status, rights, and duties of any detainee
or anyone else, other than an agency of the federal government, who might seek to bring
a judicial challenge on their behalf, the administration sent attorneys into court the
following week, seeking dismissal of all pending detainee cases. Senator Carl Levin,
co-sponsor of the Graham-Levin Amendment that specifically addressed the subject,
immediately rejected the signing statement assertion, and condemned the effort to block
critical litigation needed to resolve the status of the detainees, among other consider-
ations: "Throughout the consideration of the Graham-Levin amendment, the White
House repeatedly urged the inclusion of language that would have applied the amend-
ment retroactively to pending cases. In each case, I objected to this language. As a
result, no such language was included in the final version of the legislation."56 The
Supreme Court supported Levin's contentions and rejected what appeared to the Court
to be post hoc efforts to modify the legislative history to support the administration's
claims.57 It then went on to reject the existing regime created by the administra-
tion's military order for the creation and operation of the detention facility in
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld.5 8
As for the administration's findings concerning an implied right of action, the
Sandoval case cited in the signing statement had nothing to do with the present statute
or subject matter.59 It was an appeal of a ruling by the Eleventh Circuit on whether
an Alabama English-only constitutional amendment and resulting changes to a pro-
gram operated by the Department of Motor Vehicles violated Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.6" To the extent that the Court rejected a private right of action
under Title VI in that case, its action could hardly be considered to announce settled
law. Rather, it was a five-to-four ruling with an opinion by Justice Scalia,61 making
a dramatic shift away from a long line of contrary cases. Justice Stevens, writing for
the four dissenters, asserted: "Today, in a decision unfounded in our precedent and
hostile to decades of settled expectations, a majority of this Court carves out an
important exception to the right of private action long recognized under Title VI.
' 62
The dissenters observed:
" Press Release, Senator Carl Levin, Levin Statement on Administration Announcement
It Will Seek Dismissal of Guantanamo Lawsuits (Jan. 4, 2006), available at http://levin.senate
.gov/newsroom/release.cfm?id=250235.
56 Id.
5' Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2766 n. 10 (2006). In his dissent, Justice Scalia
criticized the Court, asserting that "the Court wholly ignores the President's signing statement."
Id. at 2816 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
58 Id. at 2798 (majority opinion).
9 See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001).
o Sandoval v. Hagan, 197 F.3d 484 (1 1th Cir. 1999), rev'd, Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275.
61 Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275.
62 Id. at 294 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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In separate lawsuits spanning several decades, we have endorsed
an action identical in substance to the one brought in this case,
demonstrated that Congress intended a private right of action to
protect the rights guaranteed by Title VI, and concluded that pri-
vate individuals may seek declaratory and injunctive relief against
state officials for violations of regulations promulgated pursuant
to Title VI. Giving fair import to our language and our holdings,
every Court of Appeals to address the question has concluded that
a private right of action exists to enforce the rights guaranteed both
by the text of Title VI and by any regulations validly promulgated
pursuant to that Title, and Congress has adopted several statutes
that appear to ratify the status quo.63
The George W. Bush administration is not the first to use such devices. The
Reagan White House issued an adamant set of findings in his signing statement fol-
lowing legislative efforts to curb enforcement of the administration's national security
directive that imposed nondisclosure requirements on executive branch officials.'
The signing statement asserted:
This provision raises profound constitutional concerns. Indeed,
a provision in last year's omnibus continuing resolution (Public
Law 100-202) identical to section 619 was recently declared un-
constitutional by the United States District Court for the District
of Columbia. The Court concluded that restrictions on the imple-
mentation or enforcement of nondisclosure agreements required
of Government employees with access to classified information
impermissibly interfered with my ability to prevent unauthorized
disclosures of our most sensitive diplomatic, military, and
intelligence activities.
As President of the United States, I have the constitutional
responsibility to ensure the secrecy of information whose disclo-
sure would threaten our national security. Our Nation's security
depends upon our success in diplomatic, military, and intelligence
activities, and that success depends upon our ability to protect the
Nation's secrets. The Supreme Court has recognized my authority
in this area. In accordance with my sworn obligation to preserve,
63 Id. (citations omitted).
64 Statement on Signing the Treasury, Postal Service and General Government Appro-
priations Act, 1989, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1204 (Sept. 22, 1988).
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protect, and defend the Constitution, section 619 will be consid-
ered of no force or effect unless and until the ruling of the District
Court is reversed by the Supreme Court.65
Here the administration declared unconstitutional provisions of law intended to
ensure to Congress the availability of information it needed to conduct oversight of
the executive branch. The national security directive in question had included blanket
coverage of agencies and officials who clearly had no real involvement in national
security matters. The directive was so controversial that some of the leaders within
the administration refused to follow it.'
The administration relied on a district court opinion not specifically cited in the
signing statement and language from the President's oath of office as authority for
the declaration that the congressional action was unlawful. Moreover, the adminis-
tration announced that its declaratory judgment would not be altered if there were to
be contrary rulings by other district courts or even by circuit courts. 67 The position
would not change unless and "until the ruling of the District Court is reversed by the
Supreme Court., 68 Just what legal authority there was for such a dramatic judgment
was not provided.69
There were other examples in the Reagan administration, including one in which
the administration simply decided that "one provision of the bill is unconstitutional."7 °
The provision also went on to rule that the offending portion of the legislation was
severable such that the rest could go forward." This was a signing statement on legis-
lation concerning construction of facilities on the Salmon and Snake rivers in Idaho.72
The administration determined that an intergovernmental cooperation provision
of the legislation that prevented the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission from
approving a hydroelectric facility unless it had approval from a local governing body
was "unconstitutional because it authorizes officials who have not been selected in a
manner consistent with the Appointments Clause ... to perform significant authority
pursuant to the laws of the United States. 73 The legal basis for the assertion that this
was a violation of the Appointments Clause was not provided.74 This declaration
65 Id. at 1205.
66 COOPER, supra note 1, at 186.
67 Statement on Signing the Treasury, Postal Service and General Government Appro-
priations Act, 1989, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1204, 1205 (Sept. 22, 1988).
68 id.
69 id.
70 Statement on Signing the Bill Prohibiting the Licensing or Construction of Facilities
on the Salmon and Snake Rivers in Idaho, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1525, 1525 (Nov. 17, 1988).
71 Id.
72 Id.
73 Id.
74 Id.
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was asserted as authoritative and final.75 Just what the President's authority and
legal foundation was for issuing a finding of severability from the remainder of the
statute that were operative was not indicated.76
Courts have been both perplexed by this kind of behavior and unwilling to accept
the practice. In Lear Siegler v. Lehman, the Ninth Circuit rejected this judicial behavior
by the White House with respect to the Reagan administration's determination that the
Competition in Contracting Act (CICA) was unconstitutional and its orders through
the Office of Management and Budget to executive branch agencies to follow the
signing statement's determination:
We also note that in declaring the CICA stay provisions uncon-
stitutional and suspending their operation, the executive branch
has assumed a role reserved for the judicial branch. It hardly need
be repeated that "it is emphatically the province and duty of the
judicial department to say what the law is."77
The kind of double-edged declaration noted above was also evident in a signing
statement issued by the George W. Bush administration on the Departments of Labor,
Health and Human Services, and Education Appropriations Act, 2002. The admin-
istration determined that congressional action was partly unconstitutional but valid
in terms of conveying budget transfer authority to the executive and that the offending
provisions were severable. "Accordingly, the executive branch shall treat the portion
of the proviso of section 207 that purports to provide for congressional committee
approval of transfers as having no force and severable from the remainder of the proviso
of section 207 and the Act.
78
In its signing statement for the Sarbanes-Oxley Act to address both the practice
and perception of financial behavior in the corporate and financial services context,
the administration purported to state authoritatively the legislative purpose of three
sections of the bill and of one section of the existing U.S. Code.79 It is not clear where
the President found authority for such pronouncements on legislative purpose. The
interpretation and its consequences for the meaning of the statute are significant and
thus are worthy of quotation at some length.
75 Id.
76 Id.
77 Lear Siegler, Inc. v. Lehman, 842 F.2d 1102, 1125 (9th Cir. 1988) rev'd in part 893
F.2d 205 (9th Cir. 1989) (citations omitted).
78 Statement on Signing the Department of Labor, Health and Human Services, and
Education, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2002, 38 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc.
50, 51 (Jan. 10, 2002).
79 Statement on Signing the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 38 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc.
1286, 1286 (July 30, 2002).
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The legislative purpose of sections 302,401, and 906 of the Act,
relating to certification and accuracy of reports, is to strengthen
the existing corporate reporting system under section 13(a) and
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Accordingly, the
executive branch shall construe this Act as not affecting the au-
thority relating to national security set forth in section 13(b) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. To ensure that no infringe-
ment on the constitutional right to petition the Government for
redress of grievances occurs in the enforcement of section 1512(c)
of title 18 of the U.S. Code, enacted by section 1102 of the Act,
which among other things prohibits corruptly influencing any
official proceeding, the executive branch shall construe the term
"corruptly" in section 1512(c)(2) as requiring proof of a criminal
state of mind on the part of the defendant.
Given that the legislative purpose of section 1514A of title 18 of
the U.S. Code, enacted by section 806 of the Act, is to protect
against company retaliation for lawful cooperation with investi-
gations and not to define the scope of investigative authority or to
grant new investigative authority, the executive branch shall con-
strue section 1514A(a)(1)(B) as referring to investigations autho-
rized by the rules of the Senate or the House of Representatives and
conducted for a proper legislative purpose.8°
When the White House asserts such an authoritative judgment on legislative intent, it
is commonly the case that the statement asserts only a conclusion and not any basis
for it. Given the well-known complexity of legislative history research to determine
legislative intent, both the executive assertion of the ability to make an authoritative
pronouncement and its basis in terms of its foundation for its decision are troublesome.
These signing statements do not simply state disagreement with Congress and are
not simply statements of the executive's view of legislation. They often specifically
direct administrative agencies as to the manner in which they are to implement legis-
lation, and they do so in a manner that may present serious challenges to the ability
of the legislative branch to carry out its assigned roles of oversight and enactment
of new and needed legislation. Thus, in the signing statement on the 21 st Century
Appropriation Authorization Act, the administration constrained the requirement for
"reporting to the Congress activities of the Department of Justice involving challenges
to or nonenforcement of law that conflicts with the Constitution."'" It also interpreted
the demand for reporting when these actions were taken pursuant to "unclassified
80 Id.
s Statement on Signing the 21st Century Department of Justice Appropriation Authori-
zation Act, 38 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1971, 1971 (Nov. 2, 2002).
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Executive Order or similar memorandum or order" as it wished.82 Executive branch
officials were directed to respond to the administration's authoritative interpretation.
The executive branch shall construe section 530D of title 28,
and related provisions in section 202 of the Act, in a manner
consistent with the constitutional authorities of the President to
supervise the unitary executive branch and to withhold infor-
mation the disclosure of which could impair foreign relations,
the national security, the deliberative processes of the Executive,
or the performance of the Executive's constitutional duties. To
implement section 202(b)(3) of the Act, the Attorney General,
on my behalf, shall advise the heads of executive agencies of the
enactment of section 202 and of this direction concerning con-
struction of that section and section 530D of title 28. Furthermore,
section 202(a) requires that the President report to the Congress
the issuance of any "unclassified Executive Order or similar memo-
randum or order" that establishes or implements a policy of intra-
circuit non-acquiescence or of refraining from enforcing, applying,
or administering a Federal statute, rule, regulation, program, or
policy on the ground that it is unconstitutional. Based upon the
text and structure of this section, the executive branch shall con-
strue this reporting Obligation to cover only unclassified orders
in writing that are officially promulgated and are not included in
the reports of the Attorney General or other Federal officers to
whom this section applies.83
The sweeping language used in this statement with respect to the ability of the
executive to withhold information has been posited and expanded over the course of
the George W. Bush administration. In such cases, the executive branch is asserting
as an interpretation meant to be binding its ability to withhold information from the
Congress that the legislature requires both in its oversight role as a matter of checks and
balances and in its legislative role to enact new or amended legislation as a matter
of separation of powers.
B. Judicial Device Two: Interpretation of Statutes to Shape Key Tests or
Standards
Although the use of these devices that have many of the characteristics of declar-
atory judgments is increasingly common, Presidents have employed other types of
judicial devices that are perhaps not as frequent or as well-known. One of these devices
82 Id.
83 Id. (emphasis added).
2007]
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
is the judicial practice of interpretation of statutes to create or reshape legal tests or
standards. Clearly, it is one thing for statutes to present policies, but the issues involved
often become more focused when one contemplates what officials must plead and
prove in an attempt to enforce those provisions of new legislation. Those interpre-
tations are normally provided injudicial opinions that arise in cases brought under the
legislation. However, presidential administrations have used signing statements to inter-
pret legal standards associated with a new statute or to amend existing tests in a manner
that attempts to shape how the legislation will be used and indeed instructs executive
branch agencies and attorneys to employ those standards in its implementation.
In August 1985, President Reagan issued a signing statement on amendments to
the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), a statute which permits recovery of attorney
fees and other expenses in some instances where administrative agency action was
unlawfully delayed or withheld.84 The administration had come into office with the
stated intention of reducing what it considered to be unnecessary and unreasonable
regulatory burdens on business and the economy, particularly targeting such bodies
as the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).85 The administration placed holds
on pending rulemaking proceedings and appointed officials who took controversial
positions on rulemaking issues, such as EPA Administrator Anne Gorsuch-Burford.86
Environmental groups and members of Congress reacted sharply against delays in the
issuance of rules to implement the superfund toxic cleanup program and moved on
other initiatives to facilitate suits against the EPA and other regulatory agencies.87
The administration created an intra-departmental EAJA task force because of its con-
cerns about how the legislation would be used in response to administration actions.88
One of the concerns was just what standard would be used in cases where an admin-
istrative agency's actions were reversed by a court on judicial review to determine
whether EAJA fees would be assessed against that agency.89
The signing statement issued by the President sought to interpret the legislation
so as to ensure a favorable standard for the determination of whether fees would be
levied against the agencies:
' Statement on Signing the Bill Extending Equal Access to Justice Act, 2 PUB. PAPERS
977 (Aug. 5, 1985).
85 See Dale Whittington & Norton Grubb, Economic Analysis in Regulatory Decisions:
The Implications of Executive Order 12291, Sci. TECH. & HUM. VALUES, Winter 1984, at
66-68 (describing the effects of the Reagan cost-benefit policies, like those found in Executive
Order 12,291, on the EPA).
86 See, e.g., Sidney A. Shapiro & Robert L. Glicksman, Congress, the Supreme Court,
and the Quiet Revolution in Administrative Law, 1988 DuKE L.J. 819, 826 n.33 (1988)
(describing Anne Gorsuch-Burford's tenure at the EPA as controversial).
87 See ROBERT F. DuRANT, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PRESIDENCY REVISITED (1992).
88 See Tarr to Spears, supra note 37.
89 See Popkin, supra note 1, at 705.
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In addition, it is my understanding in signing this bill that the
Congress recognized the important distinction between the sub-
stantial justification standard in the fee proceeding and a court's
finding on the merits that an agency action was arbitrary and
capricious or not supported by substantial evidence. The
substantial justification standard is a different standard, and an
easier one to meet, than either the arbitrary and capricious or
substantial evidence standard. A separate inquiry is required to
determine whether, notwithstanding the fact that the Govern-
ment did not prevail, the Government's position or action was
substantially justified.90
When President Reagan issued his signing statement on the Safe Drinking Water
Amendments of 1986, the administration determined that although "the bill uses
language that suggests that some enforcement actions are mandatory," such an inter-
pretation would be "unrealistic" and would also interfere with essential executive
discretion. 91 Therefore the administration would interpret the statute to provide dis-
cretionary enforcement authority and the responsible agency would proceed accord-
ingly.92 However, the legislation used mandatory language that had been a significant
issue during passage.93
The administration's action focused on a distinction that was important for a
variety of reasons, but that was particularly important because of a decision of the
Supreme Court the year before the passage of that statute, having to do with whether
and what kind of judicial review would be available under the statute.94 The Court
had held that administrative enforcement discretion was presumptively unreviewable
unless Congress had provided mandatory enforcement standards in the legislation.95
If the administration's reading of the enforcement authority as discretionary rather
than mandatory was to be accepted, the implementing agency would face a far more
favorable standard of review in court challenges than would otherwise be the case.
There was perhaps a surprising degree of agreement in Congress in reaction to
interpretations issued by the Supreme Court in the late 1980s concerning employment
9 Statement on Signing the Extension of the Equal Access to Justice Act of 1985, 21
WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 966, 967 (Aug. 5,1985). For further discussion of the use of the
statement within the administration, see Tarr, supra note 37.
"' Statement on Signing the Safe Drinking Water Amendments of 1986,22 WEEKLY COMP.
PREs. Doc. 831, 832 (June 19, 1986).
92 Id.
13 See Popkin, supra note 1, at 705-06 (noting that Reagan's interpretation of the Safe
Drinking Water Amendments directly contradicted both a Senate Committee report on the
statute and the language of the statute itself).
9 Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985).
91 Id. at 827-35.
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discrimination prohibitions in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.96 In par-
ticular there was a concern with what the Court found was required to prove a case
of discrimination and what constituted acceptable defenses against such claims. In
fact, in enacting what became the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Congress made clear in
section 2 its intention to reject the Court's interpretations in Wards Cove Packing Co.
v. Atonio,97 which the Congress found had "weakened the scope and effectiveness of
Federal civil rights protections." 98 Congress actually presented a bill99 to President
George H. W. Bush in 1990, but he vetoed it along with an indication of a willingness
to reopen negotiations leading to passage of an acceptable statute.
He ultimately agreed to sign the legislation passed in 1991 but, in so doing,
indicated that the use of the "disparate impact" standard might be applied in an inap-
propriate and unfair manner against businesses and that it might lead businesses to
adopt policies that the administration considered illegal quota or preference programs. "
The administration opposed affirmative action programs. The signing statement
sought to constrain the interpretation of that language in the statute, to influence likely
judicial opinions on that language, and to control how the new law would be imple-
mented by federal officials. The bill, he wrote:
resolves the most significant of these controversies, involving
the law of "disparate impact," with provisions designed to avoid
creating incentives for employers to adopt quotas or unfair pref-
erences. It is extremely important that the statute be properly
interpreted-by executive branch officials, by the courts, and by
America's employers-so that no incentives to engage in such
illegal conduct are created.'
In particular, the President argued that the correct interpretation had been given in
analyses offered during legislative debate by Senator Robert Dole and the Bush admin-
istration. " President Bush held, "These documents will be treated as authoritative
96 Pub. L. No. 88-352, tit. VII, 78 Stat. 241, 253-66 (codified in scattered sections 42
U.S.C. & 25 U.S.C.) (making it unlawful for employers to discriminate against individuals
because of their race, color, religion, sex, or national origin).
97 490 U.S. 642 (1989), affid in part, vacated in part 10 F.3d 1485 (9th cir. 1993), cert.
denied, 513 U.S. 809 (1994).
98 Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. 102-166, § 2(2), 105 Stat. 1071, 1071 (codified at 41
U.S.C. § 1984 (2000)).
99 S. 2104, 101st Cong. (1990).
'00 Statement on Signing the Civil Rights Act of 1991,27 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1701,
1701-02 (Nov. 25, 1991).
101 Id.
102 See 137 CONG. REc. S15, 953 (daily ed. Nov. 5, 1991) (statement of Sen. Dole); 137
CONG. REC. S15, 472-78 (daily ed. Oct. 30, 1991) (statement of Sen. Dole).
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interpretive guidance by all officials in the executive branch with respect to the law
of disparate impact as well as the other matters covered in the documents." 103
More recently, President George W. Bush, in signing the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
of 2002, offered an interpretation as to the proof required under section 1102 of the
Act. 1°4 The President said:
To ensure that no infringement on the constitutional right to
petition the Government for redress of grievances occurs in the
enforcement of section 1512(c) of title 18 of the U.S. Code, en-
acted by section 1102 of the Act, which among other things
prohibits corruptly influencing any official proceeding, the
executive branch shall construe the term "corruptly" in section
1512(c)(2) as requiring proof of a criminal state of mind on the
part of the defendant.
1 0 5
Section 1512(c)(1) addresses anyone who "corruptly--(1) alters, destroys, mutilates,
or conceals a record, document, or other object, or attempts to do so, with the intent
to impair the object's integrity or availability for use in an official proceeding," 10, but
(c)(2) adds or "otherwise obstructs, influences, or impedes any official proceeding,
or attempts to do so.' ' 10 7 The standard was therefore set for the manner in which the
executive branch would implement the broad language of (c)(2).
C. Judicial Device Three: The Practice of Construction of Legislative Language
to Avoid Constitutional Issues
This discussion of the language of the signing statement on Sarbanes-Oxley
provides an example of the common phenomenon in which the White House con-
strues the language of a statute so as to avoid presenting a constitutional issue. This is
certainly a standard canon ofjudicial construction, but just how and on what authority
the President employs the technique is less than clear.
Another example, again going back to President George H. W. Bush, arose with
respect to the signing of the Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act of
1992.108 That law included a ban on the expenditure of funds appropriated under
103 See Statement on Signing the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 27 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc.
1701, 1702 (Nov. 25, 1991).
104 Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 1102, 116 Stat. 745, 807 (codified in 18 U.S.C. § 1512 (2000)).
105 Statement on Signing the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 38 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOc.
1286 (July 30, 2002).
'06 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(1) (Supp. IV 2004).
107 Id. § 1512(c)(2).
'0' Statement on Signing the Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act, 1992,
27 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc.1143 (Aug. 17, 1991).
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the Act for the purpose of conducting studies on the pricing of hydroelectric power.
The President dismissed that prohibition:
Article II, section 3, of the Constitution grants the President
authority to recommend to the Congress any legislative measures
considered "necessary and expedient." Accordingly, in keeping
with the well-settled obligation to construe ambiguous statutory
provisions to avoid constitutional questions, I will interpret
section 506 so as not to infringe on the Executive's authority to
conduct studies that might assist in the evaluation and preparation
of such measures. 9
This kind of limitation has often been employed since the Reagan administration's
reconstruction of the signing statement device.
Clearly, the judiciary employs this and other rules of restraint based largely on
longstanding concerns about the use of its dramatic power to overturn statutory pro-
visions found in violation of the Constitution. 0 However, if the President is acting
pursuant to his constitutional obligation to ensure that the laws be faithfully executed
in issuing such statements, and if his basis for action in this case is a clear conclusion
that the flat prohibition in the statute of the kind of action the President seeks to take
on grounds of a particular provision of the Constitution that, in his judgment, is violated
by that statutory language, then it is not clear how he can avoid a constitutional con-
flict. The Article I, section 7 opportunity to veto the bill would appear to be needed
in such a situation."'
D. Judicial Device Four: Pronouncements on Article III Case or Controversy or
Jurisdictional Issues
Some Presidents have decided not only to declare the law with respect to Article I
and Article I1 powers, but also to do so with respect to the Article Im powers of the judi-
ciary. The judiciary is expected to carry out the task of determining whether a particular
dispute presents a case or controversy cognizable under Article 111, determine whether
the dispute has appropriate parties and is at an appropriate stage of development for
adjudication orjudicial review, and assess the questions of jurisdiction that must be
confronted." 2 However, Presidents sometimes make determinations like these in
signing statements.
109 Id.
"o See, e.g., Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288 (1936) (exercising judicial
restraint in limiting holding to one specific question).
..' U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7.
112 Id. art. HI, § 2; see also Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
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For example, when President Reagan signed the Medical Waste Tracking Act, he
opined that a particular provision of the legislation authorized a case or controversy
where one could not exist. 1 3 The legislation allowed the President to provide an
exemption for federal facilities from enforcement of the requirements of the statute
under certain conditions," 14 but the signing statement warned that there could not in
any circumstances be an enforcement action brought by the EPA against an executive
branch agency. 5 He explained that any such enforcement action could not proceed
because it would not be a legitimate "case or controversy" because both parties would
be part of the executive branch. 6 The language that the President is using is, of course,
taken from the Article III definition of judicial powers under the Constitution and
not the Article II powers of the President." 7
President Clinton issued his own interpretation of the requirements for standing
and the limitations of justiciability under Article III. One of the controversial dis-
cussions of the provisions of the Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the
Judiciary, and Related Appropriations Act of 1998 had to do with the methods by
which the 2000 census would be conducted.
[In providing for a right of action to challenge the use of sampling
before completion of the 2000 Census, the Act does not, nor could
it, modify the "immutable requirements" of Article III of the
Constitution regarding ripeness and standing to sue. Represen-
tatives of my Administration informed the Congress while it was
considering the census provisions of their doubts whether the
right to sue in the Act satisfies Article I requirements."18
E. Judicial Device Five: Executive Finding Contrary to Judicial Rulings
There have even been cases in which Presidents have asserted authoritative
interpretations in their signing statements when the controlling case law was plainly
contrary to their positions, though they hoped for a new direction. That happened
in a number of cases with respect to affirmative action provisions in legislation.
President George H. W. Bush issued a signing statement when he approved legislation
"' Statement on Signing the Medical Waste Tracking Act of 1988, 2 PuB. PAPERS 1430
(Nov. 2 1988).
"i' Medical Waste Tracking Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-582, § 11006, 102 Stat. 2950,
2955 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
"' Statement on Signing the Medical Waste Tracking Act of 1988, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1430
(Nov. 2, 1988).
116 Id.
"1 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
118 Statement on Signing the Departments of Commerce, Justice and State, the Judiciary,
and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 1988, 33 WEEKLY COMp. PRES. Doc. 1926, 1927
(Nov. 26, 1997).
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with respect to the controversial Superconducting Super Collider slated to be built
in Texas. The legislation called for the Department of Energy to employ affirmative
action in contracting for the project,"9 a practice the Bush administration argued was
discriminatory and therefore unconstitutional. The President wrote: "I therefore
direct the Secretary... to administer the section in a constitutional manner."' 21
However, at the time that the administration was asserting this constitutional
conclusion and relevant directions to administrators, the Supreme Court had indeed
upheld federal government affirmative action programs.' 2 ' It is true that the Court
had issued a strongly worded opinion in the Richmond, Virginia, contract set-aside
program in 1989, but the majority opinion by Justice O'Connor differentiated federal
programs, which it had upheld, from state and local programs, which the Court con-
cluded stood in a different constitutional position.122 In fact, the Court upheld another
federal affirmative action program in 1990 in Metro Broadcasting v. FCC. 23 Some
years later, the Court did take a more restrictive approach to federal government affir-
mative action programs as well as the state and local variety, but at the time of his
signing statement, the Court had unambiguously upheld the kind of program that
President Bush declared was unconstitutional and not to be implemented as written
by administration officials.124 Here again, the question is just what the basis was for
the administration in a number of its signing statements to effectively overrule the
Supreme Court.
IH. THE NEED TO CONSIDER PRESIDENTIAL JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR
MORE CAREFULLY
Certainly, there are several different criticisms and arguments that have been
leveled against the kinds of troublesome uses of presidential signing statements that
have been so common in the years since the Reagan administration, culminating in the
very expansive and even audacious use of the device by the George W. Bush admin-
istration. While recognizing the Supreme Court's oft repeated admonition that the
Framers of our Constitution intentionally created a separation of powers and checks
and balances to preserve them with ongoing debates over the boundary lines of power,
"I Pub. L. No. 102-04, § 304, 105 Stat. 510, 532 (codified in scattered sections of 38
U.S.C.).
"2 Statement on Signing the Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act, 1992,
27 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1143, 1143 (Aug. 17, 1991).
121 See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980) (upholding validity of the "minority
business enterprise" provision of the Public Works Employment Act of 1977), overruled by
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
122 Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989). While the Court overturned the
Richmond, Virginia program, it reaffirmed Fullilove. Id.
123 497 U.S. 547 (1990) (affirning constitutionality of two FCC minority preference
policies), overruled by Adarand, 515 U.S. 200.
124 See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 200.
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the Justices have also repeatedly recognized that "[t]he hydraulic pressure inherent
within each of the separate Branches to exceed the outer limits of its power, even to
accomplish desirable objectives, must be resisted." 125 That tension is to be expected.
The Court has also often repeated the fact that the Constitution did not create depart-
ments of government that were "'hermetically' sealed from one another."126 However,
"[w]hen any Branch acts, it is presumptively exercising the power the Constitution
has delegated to it.' 27 The White House, which has been so fond in recent years of
pointing out that language in legislation often runs afoul of INS v. Chadha because
it interferes with the powers of the executive, seems to forget that a careful reading
of the Court's opinion makes clear that, notwithstanding the recognition of these
realities, the separation of powers applies to all of the branches. 1
28
It is important to be clear and to stress that the Court, in varying degrees at different
times, has recognized the truth provided by Louis Fisher's now classic argument that
there is an ongoing constitutional dialogue. 129 That does not, however, mean that there
are no boundaries. When the dialogue breaks down and when lines must be drawn,
there is a need to define the limits of the authority of each of the branches. Thus, when
the Court in its separation of powers rulings quotes the language from Marbury v.
Madison3' about the function of thejudiciary and the nature ofjudicial power, it does
so with a level of sophistication appropriate to serious jurists with considerable experi-
ence in the federal government and in dealing with the pull and haul that the Framers
clearly anticipated would be with the nation long after they had departed. The statement
about the province and duty of the judiciary to say what the law is, particularly when
that phrase is quoted some two centuries after Marbury, is not used lightly or naively.
The criticism of the abuse of signing statements has tended, for obvious reasons,
to focus on tensions between the legislative and executive branches with attention to
the Presentment Clause and concerns about the creation and continued use of what
is clearly a kind of line item veto-rejected even in a case in which Congress had co-
operated with the creation of the device-as compared to the unilateral assertion of
such a device in the current context.1
3
'
With those caveats in mind, it is time to begin to ask about issues concerned with
the relationships between the executive and the judicial powers as well as those
between the executive and the legislature. The preceding discussion in this Article
has provided a variety of examples in which Presidents have behaved like judges, not
125 INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983).
126 Id. at 951 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 121 (1976)).
127 id.
128 See id.
129 See LouIS FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUES: INTERPRETATION AS POLITICAL
PROCESS (1988).
130 5. U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) ("It is emphatically the province and duty of the
judicial department to say what the law is.").
' Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998) (addressing the constitutionality of
the Line Item Veto Act, passed by Congress in 1996).
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merely offering criticism, but asserting what purport to be authoritative judgments as
to the constitutional validity and meaning of legislative provisions, along with directions
to relevant administrative officials to obey the rulings of the President, even in some
cases as compared to those of the courts.'32 Justice Alito recognized in 1986 that the
type of use of signing statements at issue was and would be seen to be an attempt to
ensure that "the President will get in the last word on questions of interpretation.' 33
That discussion was taking place at the very time that the Attorney General was in-
volved in a public conflict with both the courts and Congress over the signing statement
on the Competition in Contracting Act.'34
Groups that have explored the difficulties with the abuse of signing statements
have begun to recognize that this is an area of concern. Thus, the ABA Task Force
report incorporated in Resolution 304 concluded:
[T]he Task Force opposes the use of presidential signing statements
to effect a line-item veto or to usurp judicial authority as the final
arbiter of the constitutionality of congressional acts. Definitive
constitutional interpretations are entrusted to an independent and
impartial Supreme Court, not a partisan and interested President.
That is the meaning of Marbury v. Madison. A President could
easily contrive a constitutional excuse to decline enforcement
of any law he deplored, and transform his qualified veto into a
monarch-like absolute veto. The President's constitutional duty
is to enforce laws he has signed into being unless and until they
are held unconstitutional by the Supreme Court or a subordinate
tribunal. The Constitution is not what the President says it is.'35
A range of academics and practitioners of varied political perspectives and affili-
ations who came together in a coalition to preserve checks and balances through the
Constitution Project issued a Statement on Presidential Signing Statements. They
concluded in part:
By signing a particular bill into law, but then issuing a signing
statement that declares that he will not give effect to it, or to a
provision of it, the President is effectively vetoing the law without
affording Congress the opportunity to override the veto, as the
Constitution requires. He is effectively asserting unilateral power
to repeal and amend legislation. He also displaces the judiciary as
132 See supra notes 110-24 and accompanying text.
'33 See Alito, supra note 6, at 2.
'34 See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
135 See AM. BAR. ASS'N, supra note 11, at 23-24.
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the final expositor of the Constitution and undermines the principle
ofjudicial review crucial to our system of checks and balances. 136
Beyond academics and advocates, however, judges have been concerned as well
that, at some point, there are dangers from efforts to construct various policy instru-
ments, because there would be violations of the separation of powers in terms of in-
trusion into the judicial powers, not only the legislative and executive powers. These
concerns were expressed rather clearly, if not always in terms, with respect to con-
siderations of the legislative veto and the line item veto cases. The arguments raised
there are relevant to the discussion of signing statements.
The Supreme Court in the Chadha case warned:
There is no support in the Constitution or decisions of this Court
for the proposition that the cumbersomeness and delays often
encountered in complying with explicit constitutional standards
may be avoided, either by the Congress or by the President. With
all the obvious flaws of delay, untidiness, and potential for abuse,
we have not yet found a better way to preserve freedom than by
making the exercise of power subject to the carefully crafted
restraints spelled out in the Constitution.'37
Writing of that Chadha ruling, the Court in Clinton v. City of New York noted: "There
is no provision in the Constitution that authorizes the President to enact, to amend, or
to repeal statutes."'' 38 That included efforts to single out pieces of statutes for change
or elimination at the pleasure of the President.
Justice Powell, in his Chadha concurring opinion, however, was more direct with
respect to his concern that these activities not only raised legislative and executive
powers issues. He focused his concurring opinion on the finding that when Congress,
and presumably a President, makes the kind of determination that it did in Chadha,
it implicates a judicial function. 39 Powell was, of course, referring to the fact that
Congress had made determinations about the status and rights of particular individuals
when it exercised its legislative veto in that case. 40 Even so, he went on to speak
broadly about the dangers involved when political branches assume that they can
behave like judges.
When, for example, the George W. Bush administration undertook to pronounce
not only its understanding of the powers of the executive and the legislature with
respect to Guantanamo detainees, but also to determine their rights under federal and
136 See THE CONSTrTUTION PROJECT, supra note 11, at 2.
137 INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 959 (1983) (citation omitted).
138 524 U.S. 417, 438 (1998).
139 Chadha, 462 U.S. at 960 (Powell, J., concurring).
14" Id.
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international law and to decide that even those detainees with cases currently pending
before the courts had no basis to maintain their litigation. The President was clearly
attempting to determine authoritatively, based upon statutory and constitutional inter-
pretation, a set of specific pending cases as well as pronouncing his holding with re-
spect to the state of the law.14 ' Speaking of the legislative actions in Chadha, Justice
Powell wrote, "the separation-of-powers doctrine generally, reflect[s] the Framers'
concern that trial by a legislature lacks the safeguards necessary to prevent the abuse
of power."142 The same assertion could be maintained with respect to Presidents who
seek to behave like judges in signing statements. Powell argued that one means of
violating the separation was to "interfere impermissibly with the other's performance
of its constitutionally assigned function." 143 "Alternatively," he wrote, "the doctrine
may be violated when one branch assumes a function that more properly is entrusted
to another."' 44 To the argument that there are certainly statutes under which executive
agencies engaged in quasi-judicial behavior, he added, "[t]his function, however, forms
part of the agencies' execution of public law and is subject to the procedural safe-
guards, including judicial review, provided by the Administrative Procedure Act."145
In his understanding of the issue of setting these boundaries, Powell and others
have looked to the admonition provided by a unanimous Court in United States v. Nixon:
Notwithstanding the deference each branch must accord the others,
the "judicial Power of the United States" vested in the federal
courts by Art. Il, § 1, of the Constitution can no more be shared
with the Executive Branch than the Chief Executive, for example,
can share with the Judiciary the veto power, or the Congress share
with the Judiciary the power to override a Presidential veto. Any
other conclusion would be contrary to the basic concept of sepa-
ration of powers and the checks and balances that flow from the
scheme of a tripartite government.146
This discussion about judicial behavior has continued in lower courts as well.
While the greatest attention on legislative veto matters is paid to Chadha, the fact is
that the far more typical problem in legislative veto matters was decided by the D.C.
Circuit in Consumer Energy Council v. FERC, a case concerning legislative veto
provisions in natural gas deregulation legislation.'47 That court specifically found
'' See, e.g., Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006) (analyzing the President's uni-
lateral determination that certain detainees were eligible for trial by military commission for
then-unspecified crimes).
142 Id. at 962.
141 Id. at 963.
144 Id.
'4' Id. at 966 n.10.
146 United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 705 (1974).
673 F.2d 425 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
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that the one house veto at issue there violated the separation of powers because of
intrusion into executive powers, but also because it "intruded upon the exercise of
judicial powers."' 4s To the degree that Congress could "alter the meaning of a statute,"
without using the proper Article I process, their action "diminishes the role of the
Judiciary and expands that of Congress. Accordingly, it violates the separation of
powers doctrine."'49 The court made clear that the problem existed whether the legis-
lature was passing judgment on particular parties, reviewing administrative rule-
making, or engaging in what purported to be authoritative statutory interpretation. 5 0
The same is true of the kinds of signing statements addressed earlier.
Of course, the most direct judicial responses to the signing statement intrusion
into the judiciary came in the Ameron and Lear Siegler cases concerning the decla-
ration by the Reagan White House that provisions of the Competition in Contracting
Act were unconstitutional.'' These cases are discussed in more detail elsewhere, but
it is sufficient for the present to note that, having lost in its argument on the subject
in the district court, the administration, speaking through the Attorney General, made
it quite clear that it considered its interpretation more authoritative and would not be
bound by the court's ruling.'52 To that assertion, Judge Ackerman replied:
In reviewing the position of the Executive Branch in events both
before and after my March 27th decision, I am forced to conclude
that the fundamental role of this Court in stating what the law is
has now been challenged by the Executive Branch. Almost as dis-
concerting as the facts of such a confrontation, which I find to be
grievous, is the fact that the Executive Branch has mounted this
assault elsewhere rather than in filings submitted to this Court.'53
He was particularly upset that Attorney General Meese had declared that the
administration would not respond until the case was decided by a court competent
to decide the matter. Ackerman said:
The Executive Branch's position that they can say when a law is
unconstitutional equates the powers of mere executive officials
with those of the Judiciary. It flies in the face of the basic tenet
laid out so long ago by the United States Supreme Court in United
States v. Lee. The Court said, "No man in this country is so high
148 Id. at 477-78.
14 Id. at 478.
150 Id. at 450-51.
'' See supra note 45; see also Statement on Signing the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984,
20 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1037 (July 18, 1984).
152 See COOPER, supra note 1, at 225-27.
... Ameron, Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 610 F. Supp. 750, 754 (1985), cert.
dismissed 488 U.S. 918 (1988).
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that he is above the law. No officer of the law may set that law at
defiance, with impunity. All the officers of the Government, from
the highest to the lowest, are creatures of the law and are bound
to obey it."' 54
He added, "Any possible doubt about the matter was resolved in the historic case of
Kendall v. United States," in which the Court rejected the assertion that a President
could make a unilateral and conclusive assertion that officials of the executive branch
would not execute the law as enacted. 155
While the court of appeals narrowed the injunction issued by the district court,
it did note that "[i]t should be too obvious even to require restating that the district
court, as an Article I1 court, has the power to rule on the constitutionality of an act
of Congress and to impose appropriate remedies to compel compliance with an act
found to be constitutional."' 15 6 The Ninth Circuit responded to the administration's
arguments as well, stating that "we also note that in declaring the CICA stay provisions
unconstitutional and suspending their operation, the executive branch has assumed
a role reserved for the judicial branch."' 57 The court underscored the concern with
intrusion into Article III territory.
Passing on the constitutionality of statutory provisions and, at
times, severing constitutionally infirm provisions from the operable
remainder of a validly enacted law, is a function that is inherently
judicial. The executive branch's attempt to arrogate to itself the
power of'judicial review is a paradigmatic violation of our system
of separation of powers and checks and balances .... "If the
essential, constitutional role of thejudiciary is to be maintained,
there must be both the appearance and the reality of control by
Article I1 judges over the interpretation, declaration and application
of federal law."1
58
For all these reasons, it is time to look carefully and think seriously not only about
the degree to which contemporary signing statement practice has intruded upon the
Article I powers, but also to consider the ways in which it intrudes upon, and in some
cases even appears intended to preempt, the proper role of the judiciary under
Article III.
" Id. at 755 (citation omitted).
155 Id. at 756; see also Kendall v. United States ex rel. Stokes, 37 U.S. (12 Pet) 524 (1838).
156 Ameron, 787 F.2d at 890 (3d Cir. 1986).
157 Lear Siegler, Inc. v. Lehman, 842 F.2d 1102, 1125 (9th Cir. 1988).
"8 Id. (quoting Pacemaker Diagnostic Clinic of Am. v. Instromedix, Inc., 725 F.2d 537,
544 (9th Cir. 1984)).
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